Teilhabegerechtigkeit und das Ideal einer inklusiven Gesellschaft

Autor:innen

  • Hauke Behrendt Stuttgart

Schlagworte:

Teilhabegerechtigkeit, Inklusion, Gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, Exklusion, Sozialphilosophie, Soziale Gerechtigkeit

Key words:

Participatory justice, Inclusion, Social participation, Exclusion, Social philosophy, Social justice

Abstract

English version

​This article aims to systematically clarifying the normative foundations of the ideal of full inclusion of modern societies. The comprehensive participation of all citizens is a central requirement of social justice, which is currently referred to as the concept of participatory justice. It is the expression of an ideal of inclusion for modern societies, according to which each member should be able to participate in it as an equal. This view builds on traditional debates about justice, but at the same time adds a new perspective to them. Proponents of social participation base their claims on, in one form or another, the fundamental value of social inclusion. However, the statement that social inclusion is a desirable good is by no means trivial. Rather, from a social philosophical point of view, this aspect must be developed in such a way that a justification for the purported value of social inclusion is provided. In the context of this paper, I will argue for two main theses: 1) The value of social inclusion is not intrinsically but normatively dependent on the underlying practices to which it refers, and 2) an unequal distribution of individual positions of a social order may be morally permissible (that is, it does not violate a requirement of participatory justice), if it improves the situation of all affected. An adequately inclusive society should not marginalize individuals or groups, but must treat everyone as equal. The ideal of an inclusive society therefore stands for a society, in which every member participates in it as an equal on the basis of his or her individual talents and interests. Hence, exclusion from the society is morally wrong. However, full membership does not mean the most inclusive scheme possible in all sections of society, but rather stands for good, qualified participation.

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Zitationsvorschlag

Behrendt, H. (2018). Teilhabegerechtigkeit und das Ideal einer inklusiven Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie, 5(1), 43–72. https://doi.org/10.22613/zfpp/5.1.2

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